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Abstract
This paper provides an introduction to the theory of games of strategic complementarities,
considers Bayesian games, and provides an application to global games.
￿This paper is based on the Spanish Economic Review lecture given at the Simposio de AnÆlisis Econ￿mico,
Alicante, December 2001. Support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (project SEJ2005-08263) is
gratefully acknowledged.1 Introduction
Games of strategic complementarities are those in which any player increases his action in response
to an increase in the level of actions of rivals. The complementarity idea for an individual agent
goes back to Edgeworth (1881) with the notion that the marginal value of an action is increasing in
the level of other actions available to the agent. Many games display strategic complementarities,
including those with search, network externalities, oligopoly interaction, or technology adoption and
patent races. Additional examples include coordination failures in macroeconomics and ￿nancial
markets, as well as cumulative processes in the presence of complementarities.
The theory of monotone comparative statics and supermodular games (Topkis (1978, 1979),
Vives (1985, 1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990)) provides the set of tools to deal with comple-
mentarities. This theory, in contrast to classical convex analysis, is based on order and monotonicity
properties on lattices. The analysis of monotone comparative statics provides conditions under
which solutions to optimization problems change monotonically with a parameter. The theory of
supermodular games exploits order and monotonicity properties to ensure that the best response of
a player to the actions of rivals is increasing in their level. The approach is powerful. In the class of
supermodular games:
￿ Very general strategy spaces, including indivisibilities and functional spaces such as those
arising in dynamic or Bayesian games, are allowed.
￿ Equilibrium in pure strategies exists (without requiring quasiconcavity of payo⁄s).
￿ The equilibrium set has an order structure with extremal elements (allowing a global analysis
of the set).
￿ There is an algorithm to compute extremal equilibria, which bound also the rationalizable set,
and the equilibrium set has nice stability properties.
￿ Monotone comparative statics results are obtained with minimal assumptions and unambiguous
predictions are possible even in the presence of multiple equilibria.
The last point is particularly relevant since coordination failures and multiple equilibria are typi-
cal in the presence of complementarities. Bank or debt runs, currency crises, low activity equilibria,
adoption externalities, and development traps are some examples.
In this paper I will provide a brief intuitive account of the theory based on a very simple framework
and I will develop some connections with games of incomplete information and more in particular,
global games. The reader is referred to Vives (2005) for a more detailed account of the summary
presented in this paper, and to Topkis (1998) and Vives (1999) for general treatments of the tools
and results associated to games of strategic complementarities.
I introduce a simple class of games in Section 2 to highlight the main results of the theory.
1Section 3 deals with supermodular games and Section 4 with Bayesian games. Section 5 provides
an application to global games.
2 The basic ideas in a simple framework
In a game of strategic complementarities ￿ the term was coined in Bulow et al. (1983)￿each player
responds to an increase in the strategies of the rivals with an increase in his own strategy.
Consider a symmetric game with a continuum of players. The payo⁄ to player i is given by
￿ (ai;e a;￿) where ai 2 [0;1] is the action of the player, e a is the average or aggregate action, and ￿ is a
payo⁄-relevant parameter. Suppose that ￿ is smooth in all arguments with @2￿=(@ai)
2 < 0, and let
r(e a;￿) be the best response of an individual player to the aggregate action e a. Then any equilibrium
will be symmetric, with e a = ai = a and ful￿lling r(a;￿) = a. For interior solutions, we have that
@￿=@ai = 0 and r(￿) is continuously di⁄erentiable with





















and the best reply is increasing if @2￿=@ai@e a ￿ 0. Suppose also that @2￿=@ai@￿ ￿ 0, so that an
increase in ￿ increases the marginal pro￿t of the action of a player and consequently his best response
r(￿):
A classical example of the model are adoption, search or aggregate demand externalities (see,
e.g., Diamond (1981), Dybvig and Spatt (1983), or Cooper and John (1988)). The action ai may
be the e⁄ort of trader i in looking for a partner or the adoption level of a technology. The bene￿t
is proportional to own e⁄ort/adoption level and is increasing in the aggregate e⁄ort/adoption level
e a of others
￿ (ai;e a;￿) = ￿aig (e a) ￿ C (ai);
with ￿ > 0 and where g (￿) and the cost of e⁄ort/adoption C (￿) are increasing nonnegative functions.
In this case, @2￿=@ai@e a = ￿g0 (e a) ￿ 0 and @2￿=@ai@￿ = g (e a) ￿ 0.
In games of strategic complementarities we have typically multiple Pareto￿ rankable equilibria.
For example, suppose that g has an S-shaped function and C0 (a) ￿ a. Then r(e a) = ￿g (e a) and
there may be three equilibria given by the solutions (i.e., a;b a; and a) to ￿g (a) = a as depicted in
the lower branch of Figure 1. Larger activity equilibria dominate equilibria with less activity since
there are positive spillovers: @￿=@e a = ￿aig0 (e a) ￿ 0.
2Monopolistic competition provides another illustration. Here ai is the price of the variety
produced by ￿rm i, e a the average price in the market and ￿, say, the (common) marginal cost. We
have then
￿ (ai;e a;￿) = (ai ￿ ￿)D(ai;e a)
with D(￿) the demand function. It is easy to check that @2 log￿=@ai@e a = @2 logD=@ai@e a > 0 in
many demand systems ￿ where the elasticity of demand for product i is decreasing in the average price.
Under this condition r0 (e a) > 0 because best replies are invariant to an increasing transformation of
the payo⁄s, such as the logarithm. Furthermore, @2￿=@ai@￿ = ￿@D=@ai > 0 with downward sloping
demand. The monopolistic competition model has been used extensively in the growth, development,
regional, and international trade literatures to generate complementarities and multiplier processes
(see Matsuyama (1995) for a survey).
Several properties of the equilibria in the examples are easy to derive:
1. Existence and order structure of the equilibrium set. There exists a largest (a) and a smallest
(a) equilibrium.
2. Multiple equilibria and welfare. There are multiple equilibria when strategic complementarities
are su¢ ciently strong: r0 (a) > 1 for some candidate equilibrium such as point b a in Figure 1.
Equilibria can be Pareto ranked when there are positive spillovers.
3. Stability and rationalizability. Best￿ reply dynamics starting at a = 0 (resp,. a = 1) converge
to a (resp., a). Similarly, iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies de￿nes two
3sequences that converge, respectively, to a and a. This means that rationalizable strategies
will lie in the interval [a;a], and if the equilibrium is unique then the game will be dominance
solvable (and globally stable).
4. Comparative statics and multiplier e⁄ects. An increase in the parameter ￿ leads to an increased
action in equilibrium, via out-of-equilibrium best-reply dynamics, and this increase will be over
and above the direct e⁄ect of the increase in the parameter. Indeed, increasing ￿ will move
r(￿) upward (as in Figure 1), and the equilibrium level of a will increase. Starting at a = a,
the direct e⁄ect will lead us to r(a) > a and the full equilibrium impact to a0 > a. At a stable





1 ￿ r0 >
@r
@￿
provided that r0 > 0. The multiplier is at work whether we focus on extremal (or stable)
equilibria, or consider best￿ response dynamics after the perturbation. This is so even starting
at an unstable equilibrium, or at an equilibrium that disappears once ￿ increases (e.g. in
Figure 1 the unstable equilibrium b a disappears with the increase in ￿, moving r(￿) upward,
and best￿ reply dynamics lead to the new equilibrium a0).
3 Supermodular games
Consider the game (Ai;￿i;i 2 N), where N is the set of players, i = 1;:::;n; Ai is the strategy
set and ￿i the payo⁄ of player i 2 N (de￿ned on the cross product of the strategy spaces of the
players A). Let ai 2 Ai and a￿i 2
Q
j6=i Aj (i.e., we denote by a￿i the strategy pro￿le (a1;:::;an)
excluding the ith element). In Euclidean space a supermodular game is one where for each player
i, the strategy set Ai is a compact rectangle (or "box"), the payo⁄ function ￿i is continuous and
ful￿lls two complementarity properties:
￿ Supermodularity in own strategies (￿i is supermodular in ai): the marginal payo⁄ to any
strategy of player i is increasing in the other strategies of the player.
￿ Strategic complementarity in rivals￿strategies (￿i has increasing di⁄erences in (ai;a￿i)): the
marginal payo⁄ to any strategy of player i is increasing in any strategy of any rival player.
In a more general formulation of a supermodular game, strategy spaces need only be ￿complete
lattices￿and the continuity requirement can be weakened. Supermodularity and increasing di⁄er-
ences can also be weakened to de￿ne an ￿ordinal supermodular￿game, relaxing supermodularity to
the weaker concept of quasi￿ supermodularity and increasing di⁄erences to a single￿ crossing prop-
erty (see Milgrom and Shannon (1994)). Such properties ￿ unlike supermodularity and increasing
4di⁄erences￿have no di⁄erential characterization and need not be preserved under addition or partial
maximization operations.
In a supermodular game, very general strategy spaces can be allowed. These include indivisi-
bilities as well as functional strategy spaces, such as those arising in dynamic or Bayesian games.
Regularity conditions such as concavity and interior solutions can be dispensed with.
Results 1-4 in the simple framework, described in the previous section, generalize in a supermod-
ular game:
1￿ There always exist extremal equilibria: a largest a and a smallest element a of the equilibrium
set. If the game is symmetric the extremal equilibria are symmetric.
2￿ Multiple equilibria are common. If the game displays positive spillovers, i.e. the payo⁄ to a
player is increasing in the strategies of the other players, then the largest equilibrium point is
the Pareto best equilibrium, and the smallest one the Pareto worst.
3￿ Simultaneous best-reply dynamics approach the ￿box￿[a;a] de￿ned by the smallest and the
largest equilibrium points of the game; and converge monotonically downward (upward) to an
equilibrium starting at any point in the intersection of the upper (lower) contour sets of the
largest (smallest) best replies of the players. The extremal equilibria a and a correspond to the
largest and smallest serially undominated strategies. Therefore, if the equilibrium is unique
then the game is dominance solvable (and globally stable).
4￿ If ￿i (ai;a￿i;￿) has increasing di⁄erences in (ai;￿) for each i then with an increase in ￿: (i)
the largest and smallest equilibrium points increase; and (ii) starting from any equilibrium,
best￿ reply dynamics lead to a larger equilibrium following the parameter change.
Those results hold for multidimensional strategy spaces, be it discrete or continuous, functional
spaces, as well as for payo⁄s which need not be smooth or concave. In order to obtain the desired
results only the monotonicity properties of incremental payo⁄s and the order properties of strategies
matter. The approach is based on monotone comparative statics results developed by Topkis (1978)
and the application of Tarski￿ s ￿xed point theorem to increasing functions (Tarski (1955)).
4 Bayesian games
The approach has proved useful when analyzing Bayesian games, in particular the di¢ cult issue of
existence of equilibrium in pure strategies with a continuum of types and/or actions. Results have
been obtained for supermodular games with general action and type spaces (Vives (1990)); for games
in which each player uses a strategy increasing in type in response to increasing strategies of rivals
5(Athey (2001)); and for ￿monotone supermodular" games with general action and type spaces (Van
Zandt and Vives (2007)). We will brie￿ y describe the last contribution and apply it to the analysis
of a global game example in the next section.
Let Ti (a subset of Euclidean space) be the set of possible types ti of player i. The types of
the players are drawn from a common prior distribution ￿ on T =
Qn
i=0 Ti , where T0 is residual
uncertainty not observed by any player. The action space of player i is a compact rectangle of
Euclidean space Ai, and his payo⁄is given by the (measurable and bounded) function ￿i : A￿T ! R.
The ex post payo⁄ to player i when the vector of actions is a = (a1;:::;an) and when the realized
types t = (t1;:::;tn) is thus ￿i (a;t). Action spaces, payo⁄ functions, type sets, and the prior
distribution are common knowledge. The Bayesian game is described by (Ai;Ti;￿i;i 2 N).
A pure strategy for player i is a (measurable) function ￿i : Ti ! Ai that assigns an action to
every possible type of the player. Let ￿i denote the strategy space of player i and identify two
strategies if they are equal with probability 1. We can de￿ne a natural order in the strategy space
￿i : ￿i ￿ ￿0
i if ￿i (ti) ￿ ￿0
i (ti), in the usual componentwise order, with probability one on Ti.
This formulation of a Bayesian game encompasses both common and private values as well as
perfect or imperfect signals.
Van Zandt and Vives (2007) show the following result. Let ￿(T￿i) be the set of probability
distributions on T￿i and let player i￿ s posteriors be given by the (measurable) function pi : Ti !
￿(T￿i), consistent with the prior ￿ (the common prior assumption can be relaxed). De￿ne a
monotone supermodular game as follows.
1. Supermodularity in payo⁄s: ￿i supermodular in ai, and with increasing di⁄erences in (ai;a￿i).
2. Complementarity between action and type: ￿i has increasing di⁄erences in (ai;t).
3. Monotone posteriors: pi : Ti ! ￿(T￿i) is increasing with respect to the partial order on
￿(T￿i) of ￿rst￿ order stochastic dominance (a su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition is that
the prior ￿ be a¢ liated).
In a monotone supermodular game there is a largest and a smallest Bayesian equilibrium and
each one is in monotone strategies in type. There might be other equilibria that are in nonmonotone
strategies but, if so, they will be between the largest and the smallest one, which are monotone in
type. Furthermore, the extremal equilibria are increasing in the posteriors.
Monotone supermodular games have been applied to characterize equilibria in adoption games on
graphs, multimarket oligopoly, team problems, and games of voluntary disclosure (see Vives (2005)).
65 Global games
Global games were introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) as games of incomplete infor-
mation with types determined by each player observing a noisy signal of the underlying state. The
aim is to select an equilibrium with a perturbation of a complete information game. The authors
show that in 2 ￿ 2 games if each player observes a noisy signal of the true payo⁄s and if ex ante
feasible payo⁄s include payo⁄s that make each action strictly dominant, then as noise becomes small
an iterative strict dominance selects one equilibrium. The equilibrium selected is the risk-dominant
one if there are two equilibria in the complete information game. Carlsson and van Damme do not
explicitly consider supermodular games but when we have two equilibria in a complete information
game, the game is one of strategic complementarities. Global games have been developed in a range
of applications by Morris and Shin (2002). I will present here an example, a variation of the simple
framework of Section 2 with incomplete information, to highlight the power of the supermodular
game approach.
Suppose an agent must decide whether or not to adopt a new technology (or whether to ￿invest￿ ,
￿ act￿ , or ￿participate￿ ). The action is ai = 0 if there is no adoption and is ai = 1 if there is adoption.
The cost ￿i of adoption for agent i follows a normal distribution with mean ￿￿ and variance ￿2
￿.
The parameters ￿i and ￿j (j 6= i) are potentially correlated with covariance ￿￿2
￿ and correlation
coe¢ cient ￿ 2 [0;1). The bene￿t of adoption is g (e a), where e a is the total mass adopting (between
0 and 1), and no adoption yields no bene￿t. We have thus a variation, with idiosyncratic random
parameter, of the simple framework where the payo⁄ to player i is:
￿ (ai;e a;￿i) = ai (g (e a) ￿ ￿i):
If g0 > 0 then the game is monotone supermodular because ￿(ai;e a;￿i) has increasing di⁄erences
in (ai;(e a;￿￿i)) (that is, @2￿=@ai@e a = g0 (e a) > 0 and @2￿=@ai@ (￿￿i) = 1 > 0) and types are
a¢ liated (because of normality). It follows that extremal equilibria exist, are symmetric (because
the game is symmetric), and are in monotone (decreasing) strategies of the form ai = 1 if and only
if ￿i ￿ b ￿. Let g (e a) = ￿e a with ￿ > 0 for purposes of illustration.
From the point of view of player i and given ￿i, the adopting mass when other players use the
equilibrium threshold b ￿ will be estimated by
e a(￿i) ￿ Pr[￿j ￿ b ￿j￿i] = ￿
 






where ￿(￿) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal. The agent will adopt




is given implicitly by the solution in ￿ to
7￿
￿
Pr[￿j ￿ b ￿j￿]
￿
























The solution will be unique if ^ r0 < 1 or ￿
p
(1 ￿ ￿)=(1 + ￿)(￿￿)
￿1 ￿(￿) < 1, where ￿(￿) is the










This will be so when the degree of strategic complementarity is not too strong. This may happen
either because payo⁄ complementarities are weak (￿ low); or because each player ex ante faces a
large cost uncertainty (￿￿ high); or because the correlation of the costs is high (￿ close but not equal
to 1). All three factors tend to lessen the strength of strategic complementarities.
Let ￿ = 1 in order to illustrate the e⁄ect of uncertainty. If costs are perfectly correlated then there
are multiple equilibria for ￿ 2 (0;1). In this case, there is complete information because a player,
by knowing his own cost, knows the costs of any other player. However, a little bit of imperfect cost
correlation (￿ close to 1) or a di⁄use prior (￿2
￿ ! 1) ￿ following the idea of equilibrium selection in





1=2 either when ￿￿ ! 1 or as ￿ ! 1, yielding the unique solution b ￿ = 1=2. Figure 2 displays ^ r(￿)
for the case ￿￿ = 1=2, and b ￿ = ￿￿ = 1=2 is the equilibrium threshold (with the cases ￿ = :25 and
￿ = :75). In this case if
p
(1 ￿ ￿)=(1 + ￿)=
p
2￿￿2
￿ > 1, two more equilibria appear.
Either with a di⁄use prior or when the cost of a player gives very precise information about
the costs of others, the (strategic) uncertainty of player i is maximal about the behavior of others.
In both cases cases the player puts very little weight on prior information: when ￿2
￿ is very large
because the prior is ￿ at; when is ￿ close to 1 because the type of the player predicts almost perfectly
the types of others. This induces a best response for the player which is quite ￿￿ at￿ , that is, not
very sensitive to the threshold used by others and uniqueness obtains.
A standard procedure in a global game (e.g. Morris and Shin (2002)) would ￿nd the largest and
smallest equilibrium thresholds by iterated elimination of dominated strategies, show that there is no
loss of generality is assuming threshold strategies, and ￿nally ￿nd conditions under which the largest
and smallest equilibrium thresholds coincide.2 By using the theory of (monotone) supermodular
1If x ￿ N
￿
￿;￿2￿






, where f is the density of x.
2Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003) obtain a generalization of the uniqueness result to games of strategic com-
plementarities.
8games we obviate the step of solving the iterated elimination of dominated strategies process, because
in a supermodular game extremal equilibria are the outcome of iterated elimination of dominated
strategies; we obtain immediately that extremal equilibrium strategies are of the threshold form
￿ because in a monotone supermodular game extremal equilibria are monotone in type; and we
bring forward the intuition for the uniqueness result in terms of lessening the strength of strategic
complementarities. This helps to understand why in some occasions reducing noise and in others
increasing it is necessary to obtain a unique equilibrium.
Indeed, we can start by noting that the game is monotone supermodular. This means that
extremal equilibria exist and are in monotone (threshold) strategies. Those extremal equilibria can
be found starting at extremal points of the strategy sets of players (b ￿ = 1 or b ￿ = ￿1) and iterating
using best responses. Typically, we must make sure that the process is not stuck at extremal points
of the strategy space (and boundary assumptions may be used for this purpose). The extremal
equilibrium thresholds bound the set of rationalizable strategies, and if the equilibrium is unique
then the game is dominance solvable. The condition for equilibrium uniqueness is precisely that
strategic complementarities are not too strong.
In the region where equilibrium is unique we can perform easily comparative statics analysis. For
example, we can check that there is a multiplier e⁄ect of public information. An increase in ￿￿ will
have an e⁄ect on the equilibrium threshold b ￿ over and above the direct impact on the best response




























whenever the uniqueness condition (r0 < 1) is met since the game is of strategic complementarities
(r0 > 0). The multiplier is largest when r0 is close to 1, that is, when we approach the multiplicity
of equilibria region. The multiplier e⁄ect of public information is emphasized by Morris and Shin
(2002) in terms of the coordinating potential of public information beyond its strict information con-
tent. The reason is that public information becomes common knowledge and a⁄ects the equilibrium
outcome. Every player knows that an increase in ￿￿ will shift downward the best replies of the rest
of the players and everyone will be more cautious in adopting.
The uniqueness property is nice in a game, but we can still perform comparative statics analysis
in a game of strategic complementarities even if there are multiple equilibria. For example, in the
uniqueness region, r0 < 1, we have that db ￿
d￿￿ =
@r=@￿￿
1￿r0 < 0. In the multiple equilibrium region the
result still holds for extremal equilibrium thresholds ￿ or for reasonable out-of-equilibrium dynamics
that eliminate the middle ￿unstable￿ equilibrium. Indeed, we know that extremal equilibria of
monotone supermodular games are increasing in the posteriors of the players. A su¢ cient statistic
for the posterior of a player under normality is E (￿jj￿i) = ￿￿i + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿; which is increasing in
￿￿ for ￿ < 1. It follows then that increasing ￿￿ will increase the extremal equilibrium thresholds.
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